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Existential	Instantiation,		Arbitrary	Reference	and	Supposition	
Wylie	Breckenridge	
	
Existential	 instantiation	 is	 a	 rule	 of	 inference	 that	 allows	 us	 infer,	 from	 the	
proposition	that	there	are	some	p	things,	the	proposition	that	a	is	a	p	thing.	What	
role	 does	 'a'	 play	 here?	 According	 to	 one	 account,	 recently	 defended	 by	
Breckenridge	and	Magidor,	we	use	'a'	to	refer	to	a	p	thing.	I	argue	that	this	cannot	
be	right.	 I	propose	an	alternative	account,	according	to	which	we	use	'a'	to	refer	
to	a	supposedly	p	thing.	
	
1.	Existential	instantiation	
	
Suppose	that	p	and	q	are	properties.	Here	is	a	valid	argument:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	p	things	
2.	 All	p	things	are	q	things	
Therefore,	
C.	 There	are	some	q	things	
	
If	 its	 validity	 is	 not	 immediately	 apparent	 then	 we	 can	 make	 it	 more	 apparent	 by	
adding	some	intermediate	steps,	as	follows:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	p	things	(Premise)	
2.	 All	p	things	are	q	things	(Premise)	
3.	 a	is	a	p	thing	(From	1,	by	existential	instantiation)	
4.	 a	is	a	q	thing	(From	2	and	3,	by	universal	instantiation)	
C.	 There	are	some	q	things	(From	4,	by	existential	generalisation)	
	
Line	3	is	an	application	of	existential	instantiation.	When	presenting	this	argument	we	
might	more	naturally	say,	“Let	a	be	p	thing”,	but	it	is	standardly	presented	in	writing	as	
“a	is	a	p	thing”.	
	
2.	The	role	of	‘a’	and	the	p	thing	account	
	
What	 role	 does	 ‘a’	 play	 in	 line	 3,	 and	 then	 again	 in	 line	 4?	 Although	 existential	
instantiation	is	discussed	in	standard	textbooks	on	first-order	logic,	typically	not	much	
is	 said	 about	 the	 role	 of	 ‘a’,	 other	 than	 that	 it	 ‘stands	 for	 an	 arbitrary	 p	 thing’	 (or	
something	like	that).	Proving	that	the	rules	involving	the	introduction	and	elimination	
of	terms	such	as	‘a’	are	sound	and	complete	tells	us	that	by	following	these	rules	we	
can	prove	exactly	what	we	should	be	able	to	prove,	but	it	does	not	tell	us	much	about	
what	‘a’	means.	This	turns	out	to	be	complicated.	Various	accounts	have	been	offered.	
According	to	some	accounts	we	use	‘a’	as	a	meaningless	symbol.	According	to	others	
we	use	it	as	a	variable.	According	to	Kit	Fine	(1985)	we	use	it	to	refer	to	the	arbitrary	p	
thing	–	a	special	kind	of	thing	that	is	not	an	ordinary	p	thing.	(For	details	and	further	
references	see	B&M	2012.)	
	
Breckenridge	and	Magidor	(2012)	have	recently	argued	against	each	of	these	accounts.	
They	defend	an	alternative	referential	account,	according	to	which	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	
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to	 a	 p	 thing	 (an	 ordinary	 p	 thing,	 not	 Fine’s	 arbitrary	 p	 thing).	 On	 this	 view	 line	 3	
actually	serves	a	dual	role	–	we	use	it	to	fix	the	reference	of	‘a’	to	a	p	thing,	and	also	to	
express	the	proposition	that	a	is	a	p	thing.	By	writing	“a	is	a	p	thing”	we	emphasize	the	
second	of	these	two	roles;	we	could	instead	emphasize	the	first	role	by	writing	“Let	a	
be	a	p	thing”.	
	
Defending	this	view	of	 ‘a’	 is	not	the	main	aim	of	B&M’s	paper	–	their	main	aim	is	to	
defend	 what	 they	 call	 ‘arbitrary	 reference’,	 the	 view	 that	 we	 can	 refer	 to	 things	
arbitrarily.	Nevertheless,	their	main	argument	for	arbitrary	reference	depends	on	this	
view	of	the	role	of	‘a’.	They	argue:	In	line	3	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	p	thing;	we	can	only	
get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 p	 thing	 if	 we	 can	 arbitrarily	 refer;	 therefore,	 we	 can	 arbitrarily	
refer.		
	
3.	Problems	for	the	p	thing	account	
	
I	 am	 persuaded	 by	 B&M’s	 arguments	 against	 meaningless	 symbol	 accounts	 of	 ‘a’,	
against	 variable	accounts	of	 ‘a’,	 and	against	 Fine’s	 referential	 account	of	 ‘a’,	 and	 for	
the	rest	of	this	paper	I	will	assume	that	these	accounts	are	wrong	and	that	some	other	
referential	account	is	right.	But	I’m	not	persuaded	by	the	referential	account	defended	
by	B&M.	In	fact,	I	think	it	must	be	wrong.	
	
B&M	do	not	say	such	much	about	what	kind	of	p	thing	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	in	line	3,	
and	it	is	difficult	to	see	what	kind	of	p	thing	it	could	be.	It	cannot	be	an	actual	p	thing,	
because	for	some	properties	p	there	are	no	actual	p	things.	Nor	can	it	be	a	possible	p	
thing,	because	for	some	properties	p	there	are	no	possible	p	things	 (it	might	also	be	
impossible	to	refer	to	merely	possible	p	things,	at	least	for	some	properties	p).	So	they	
can’t	claim	that	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	an	actual	or	possible	p	thing.	
	
It	won’t	do	for	them	to	say	that	these	properties	are	special	–	that	for	these	properties	
either	a	different	account	is	needed	or	that	existential	instantiation	does	not	work.	The	
original	argument	is	valid,	and	the	extended	argument	helps	to	show	that	it	is	valid,	no	
matter	which	properties	p	and	q	are;	 in	particular,	no	matter	which	property	p	 is.	So	
they	need	an	account	of	‘a’	that	works	for	all	properties	p.	
	
There	 are	 also	 problems	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 ‘a’	 refers	 to	 a	 p	 thing	 even	 for	 some	
properties	p	that	have	actual	instances.	
	
First,	 let	 p	 be	 the	 property	 of	 being	 male.	 This	 has	 actual	 instances.	 But	 if	 q	 is	 a	
property	that	is	inconsistent	with	p,	such	as	being	not	male,	then	there	are	no	possible	
circumstances	 in	which	 the	premises	 are	both	 true.	 So,	 if	 ‘a’	 is	 supposed	 to	 refer	 to	
some	p	thing	in	some	circumstance	is	which	the	premises	are	both	true	then	‘a’	cannot	
refer	to	anything	(because	there	are	no	such	circumstances).	
	
Second,	 let	 p	 be	 the	 property	 of	 being	 a	 never-referred-to	 thing	 (see	 Haze	
(Forthcoming)).	This	has	actual	instances.	But	‘a’	cannot	refer	to	any	of	them,	because	
that	amounts	to	‘a’	referring	to	a	never-referred-to	thing,	which	it	cannot	do,	because	
if	it	did	then	that	thing	would	not	be	a	never-referred-to	thing.	
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Again,	 it	 won’t	 do	 for	 B&M	 to	 say	 that	 these	 properties	 are	 special.	 The	 original	
argument	is	valid,	and	the	extended	argument	helps	to	show	that	it	is	valid,	no	matter	
which	properties	p	and	q	are.	They	need	an	account	that	works	for	all	properties	p	and	
q.	
	
So	I	don’t	see	how	a	referential	account	of	‘a’	can	successfully	maintain	that	we	get	‘a’	
to	refer	to	a	p	thing.	
	
4.	A	proposal:	the	supposedly	p	thing	account	
	
I	have	a	suggestion,	and	presenting	this	suggestion	is	the	main	purpose	of	this	paper.	A	
referential	account	of	‘a’	cannot	claim	that	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	p	thing	(as	we	have	
just	seen).	But	it	might	be	able	to	claim	that	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing	
(that	 is,	 a	 thing	 that	 supposedly	 has	 p).	 Moreover,	 this	 might	 still	 give	 B&M	 an	
argument	 for	 arbitrary	 reference,	 as	 follows:	 In	 line	 3	 we	 get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 a	
supposedly	 p	 thing;	 we	 can	 only	 get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 supposedly	 p	 thing	 if	 we	 can	
arbitrarily	refer;	 therefore,	we	can	arbitrarily	refer.	And	 it	might	allow	them	to	avoid	
the	problems	that	I	have	presented	above.	
	
My	task	now	is	to	explain	all	of	this.		
	
Suppose	that	we	are	developing	a	referential	account	of	the	role	of	‘a’	in	the	extended	
argument	–	 that	 is,	an	account	according	 to	which	we	use	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 something.	
Let’s	think	through	how	the	account	should	go.	
	
One	thing	that	we’d	like	the	account	to	do	is	explain	how	the	extended	argument	helps	
us	to	see	that	the	original	argument	is	valid.	How	might	our	account	do	this?	
	
We	 might	 try	 saying	 this:	 by	 adding	 lines	 3	 and	 4	 to	 the	 argument	 we	 break	 the	
inference	down	into	some	smaller	steps,	each	of	which	is	more	clearly	valid	than	the	
step	 from	1	and	2	 to	C.	 (i.e.	 lines	3	and	4	are	 intermediate	consequences.)	The	 idea	
would	be	this:	C	follows	from	1	and	2,	because	C	follows	from	4,	and	4	follows	from	2	
and	3,	and	3	follows	from	1.	This	is	a	common	way	of	adding	lines	to	an	argument	to	
make	its	validity	more	apparent.	
	
But	we	can’t	 say	 this.	 In	particular,	we	 can’t	 say	 that	3	 follows	 from	1	 (although	we	
might	be	able	to	say	that	4	follows	from	2	and	3).	According	to	the	account	that	we	are	
developing,	‘a’	refers	to	something.	For	3	to	follow	from	1	we	need	the	following	to	be	
the	case:	it	is	not	possible	for	1	to	be	true	while	3	is	false;	that	is,	it	is	not	possible	for	
there	 to	 be	 some	 p	 things	 without	 a	 being	 a	 p	 thing.	 So	 we	 need	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	
something	 x	 such	 that:	 necessarily,	 if	 there	 are	 any	p	 things	 then	 x	 is	 a	 p	 thing.	 For	
some	properties	p	there	 is	such	a	thing.	The	property	of	being	Bill	Gates	 is	one	such	
property	(necessarily,	if	there	are	any	things	that	have	this	property	then	Bill	Gates	has	
this	property).	So	is	the	property	of	being	a	number	(necessarily,	if	there	are	any	things	
that	 have	 this	 property	 then	 2	 has	 this	 property),	 and	 the	 property	 of	 being	 even	
(necessarily,	 if	there	are	any	things	that	have	this	property	then	2	has	this	property).	
	 4	
But,	and	this	is	the	problem,	for	some	properties	p	there	is	no	such	thing.	The	property	
of	being	human	is	one	such	property.	There	is	no	x	such	that:	necessarily,	if	there	are	
any	 humans	 then	 x	 is	 human.	 (i.e.	 every	 x	 is	 such	 that:	 possibly,	 there	 are	 some	
humans	but	x	is	not	human.)	We	want	an	account	that	works	for	all	properties	p,	so	it	
cannot	be	part	of	our	account	that	3	follows	from	1.		
	
Another	 common	 way	 of	 adding	 lines	 to	 an	 argument	 to	 make	 its	 validity	 more	
apparent	is	to	make	a	supposition.	Perhaps	we	can	say	that	in	line	3	we	are	making	a	
supposition?	 No,	 we	 cannot	 say	 this	 either.	 If	 3	 is	 a	 supposition	 then	 it	 has	 to	 be	
discharged	 before	 the	 argument	 is	 complete.	 There	 are	 two	 places	 that	 it	might	 be	
discharged:	either	after	line	4,	or	after	C.	
	
Suppose	that	it	is	discharged	after	line	4,	by	adding	line	5	as	follows:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	p	things	(Premise)	
2.	 All	p	things	are	q	things	(Premise)	
3.	 a	is	a	p	thing	(Supposition)	
4.	 a	is	a	q	thing	(From	2	and	3,	by	universal	instantiation)	
5.	 If	a	is	a	p	thing	then	a	is	a	q	thing	(From	3	–	4	by	conditional	proof)	
C.	 There	are	some	q	things	(From	?)	
	
This	 cannot	be	 the	extended	argument.	 For	 from	which	of	 the	previous	 lines	does	C	
follow?	 We	 have	 lines	 1,	 2	 and	 5	 available	 (3	 and	 4	 are	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
supposition).	It	is	no	help	to	say	that	it	follows	from	lines	1	and	2	because	that’s	what	
we	are	trying	to	show.	It	does	not	follow	from	lines	1	and	5	(it	is	possible	for	1	and	5	to	
be	 true	without	 C	 being	 true)(remember	 that	 according	 to	 the	 account	 that	we	 are	
developing,	 ‘a’	 is	 not	 a	 variable	 –	 it	 refers	 to	 something	 –	 and	 5	 is	 not	 a	 universal	
quantification).	 It	does	not	 follow	from	 lines	2	and	5	 (it	 is	possible	 for	2	and	5	 to	be	
true	without	C	being	true).	And	it	does	not	follow	from	line	5	(it	is	possible	for	5	to	be	
true	without	C	being	true).	
	
Suppose	that	it	is	discharged	it	after	C,	by	adding	C'	as	follows:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	p	things	(Premise)	
2.	 All	p	things	are	q	things	(Premise)	
3.	 a	is	a	p	thing	(Supposition)	
4.	 a	is	a	q	thing	(From	2	and	3,	by	universal	instantiation)	
C.	 There	are	some	q	things	(From	4,	by	existential	generalisation)	
C'.	If	a	is	a	p	thing	then	there	are	some	q	things	(From	3	–	C	by	conditional	proof)	
	
This	 cannot	 be	 the	 extended	 argument	 either,	 because	 it	 does	 not	 have	 the	 right	
conclusion.	 Perhaps	 there	 is	 an	 implicit	 further	 conclusion,	 C":	 There	 are	 some	 q	
things.	 (This	 is	 just	 a	 repetition	 of	 C,	 but	 this	 time	 it	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
supposition.)	But	from	which	of	the	previous	lines	does	C"	follow?	We	have	lines	1,	2	
and	C'	available	(3,	4	and	C	are	within	the	scope	of	the	supposition).	It	is	no	help	to	say	
that	 it	 follows	from	lines	1	and	2	because	that’s	what	we	are	trying	to	show.	 It	does	
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not	follow	from	lines	1	and	C',	 it	does	not	follow	from	lines	2	and	C',	and	it	does	not	
follow	from	line	C'.	
	
So	we	have	this:	if	our	account	is	that	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	something	then	to	explain	
why	 adding	 lines	 3	 and	4	 is	 helpful	we	 cannot	 say	 that	 line	 3	 follows	 from	previous	
lines,	but	nor	can	we	say	that	it	is	a	supposition.	
	
So	what	can	we	say?	 I	 think	we	can	say	this:	 the	extended	argument	helps	us	to	see	
that	the	original	argument	is	valid	by	helping	us	to	see	that	C	is	true	on	the	supposition	
that	1	and	2	are	true.	And	this,	in	turn,	gives	our	account	a	possible	referent	for	‘a’	–	a	
supposedly	p	thing.	
	
This	needs	some	explaining.	
	
We	start	by	supposing	that	the	premises	are	both	true.	
	
This	is	certainly	one	way	that	we	can	start	to	show	that	the	original	argument	is	valid.	
Showing	that	the	original	argument	is	valid	is	equivalent	to	showing	that	the	following	
proposition	is	necessarily	true:	if	there	are	some	p	things	and	all	p	things	are	q	things	
then	 there	 are	 some	 q	 things.	 One	way	 to	 do	 this	 is	 to	 start	 by	 supposing	 that	 the	
antecedent	is	true	and	then	use	conditional	proof.	(This	is	not	the	only	way	–	we	could	
start	by	supposing	that	the	proposition	 is	 false	and	then	use	proof	by	contradiction.)	
Now,	supposing	that	the	antecedent	is	true	amounts	to	supposing	that	the	premises	of	
the	original	argument	are	both	true.	So	we	can	see	that	the	original	argument	is	valid	
by	first	supposing	that	the	premises	are	both	true.	What	I’m	proposing	here	is	that	this	
is	what	we	do	when	we	use	the	extended	argument	to	see	that	the	original	argument	
is	valid.	
	
So	we	 start	by	 supposing	 that	 the	premises	are	both	 true.	 In	particular,	we	 suppose	
that	there	are	some	p	things.	
	
Next,	line	3.	According	to	the	referential	account	that	we	are	trying	to	develop,	in	this	
line	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	something.	For	the	reasons	that	I	explained	earlier,	we	can’t	
say	that	we	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	p	thing,	either	actual	or	possible.	But	we	might	be	able	
to	say	this:	we	get	 ‘a’	 to	refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing.	The	 idea	 is	this:	by	supposing	
that	 there	are	some	p	 things	we	make	 it	 the	case	 that	 there	are	some	supposedly	p	
things	 (that	 is,	 some	 things	 that	 supposedly	 have	 p),	 no	matter	which	 property	 p	 is	
(and	no	matter	whether	there	are	any	actual	or	possible	p	things);	then	in	line	3	we	get	
‘a’	to	refer	to	one	of	these	supposedly	p	things.	
	
The	 crucial	 part	 of	 this	 proposal	 is	 the	 following	 claim:	 by	 supposing	 that	 there	 are	
some	p	things	we	make	it	the	case	that	there	are	some	supposedly	p	things.	We	need	
not	 claim	 that	 these	 supposedly	p	 things	are	always	created	 by	 the	 supposition.	We	
can	allow	that	we	can	suppose	that	there	are	some	p	things	by	thinking	about	some	
actual	 things	and	 supposing	 that	 they	have	p	–	 in	 this	 case	we	wouldn’t	be	 creating	
these	things	(there	already	are	these	things),	we	would	just	be	making	it	the	case	that	
they	supposedly	have	p.	We	can	allow	this,	but	we	shouldn’t	 require	 it	–	 it	 could	be	
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that	to	suppose	that	there	are	some	p	things	we	cannot	think	of	any	actual	things	and	
suppose	them	to	have	p.	This	is	what	we	should	say:	if	we	suppose	that	there	are	some	
p	things	then	there	are	some	things	that	supposedly	have	p	(which	we	may	or	may	not	
create	 by	 making	 the	 supposition).	 If	 we	 do	 create	 these	 things	 in	 making	 the	
supposition	then	their	existence	depends	on	the	supposition,	and	lasts	just	as	long	as	
the	supposition	lasts.	
	
This	 claim,	 that	 if	 we	 suppose	 that	 there	 are	 some	 p	 things	 then	 there	 are	 some	
supposedly	 p	 things,	 is	 obviously	 a	 controversial	 claim.	 But	 it	 is	 in	 good	 company	 –	
there	 is	 a	 precedent	 for	 this	 kind	 of	 claim	 in	 theories	 of	 fiction.	 According	 to	 some	
theories	of	fiction,	if	an	author	creates	a	work	of	fiction,	and	it	is	part	of	the	fiction	that	
there	 are	 some	 p	 things,	 then	 the	 author	 thereby	makes	 it	 the	 case	 that	 there	 are	
some	fictionally	p	things	(that	is,	some	things	that	fictionally	have	p)(see	for	example	
Kripke	 (2013),	 Searle	 (1975),	 van	 Inwagen	 (1977)).	 These	 things	 need	not	 be	merely	
fictional	things	–	they	could	be	real	things	which	feature	in	the	fiction.	Or	they	could	be	
merely	fictional	things,	things	that	are	created	when	the	fiction	is	created	and	last	as	
long	as	the	fiction	lasts.	Either	way,	in	creating	the	work	of	fiction	the	author	makes	it	
the	 case	 that	 there	 are	 some	 fictionally	 p	 things.	What	 I	 am	 suggesting	 is	much	 the	
same	 thing,	 just	 applied	 to	 the	making	 of	 suppositions	 rather	 than	 the	 authoring	 of	
fictions.	Making	a	supposition	is,	after	all,	very	much	like	telling	a	story.	In	fact,	we	can	
show	that	the	original	argument	above	is	valid	by	telling	a	story	instead:	“Once	upon	a	
time	there	were	some	p	things,	and	all	p	things	were	q	things.	Let’s	call	one	of	these	p	
things	‘a’.	So	a	was	a	p	thing.	And,	since	all	p	things	were	q	things,	a	was	also	a	q	thing.	
So	there	were	some	q	things.”	
	
Note	 that	 the	 account	 of	 ‘a’	 that	 I	 am	 suggesting	 here	 is	 different	 from	 the	 p	 thing	
account	defended	by	B&M.	Both	accounts	are	referential	accounts	(i.e.	both	claim	that	
we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	something),	but	whereas	the	B&M	account	says	that	we	use	it	to	
refer	 to	 a	 p	 thing,	 this	 account	 says	 that	we	use	 it	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 supposedly	 p	 thing.	
Although	 it	 is	 different	 from	 their	 account,	 it	might	 still	 give	 them	 an	 argument	 for	
arbitrary	reference.	For	we	might	still	need	to	appeal	to	arbitrary	reference	to	account	
for	how	we	can	refer	to	a	particular	one	of	these	supposedly	p	things	 in	the	cases	 in	
which	there	are	more	than	one.	If	so,	B&M	can	argue	as	follows:	In	line	3	we	get	‘a’	to	
refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing;	we	can	only	get	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing	if	we	
can	arbitrarily	refer;	therefore,	we	can	arbitrarily	refer.	
	
I	don’t	know	whether	the	account	that	I	am	proposing	is	true	(I’m	worried	about	the	
crucial	 claim,	 that	 if	we	 suppose	 that	 there	 are	 some	 p	 things	 then	 there	 are	 some	
supposedly	p	 things).	But	 if	we	want	 to	maintain	 that	 in	 line	3	we	get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	
something	then	I	don’t	see	any	alternative.	
	
Actually,	there	is	an	alternative,	but	it	is	not	one	that	is	open	to	a	referential	account	
of	‘a’,	because	it	is	not	one	on	which	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	something.	The	alternative	
is	 to	 say	 that	 in	 line	 3	 we	merely	 suppose	 that	 ‘a’	 refers	 to	 a	 p	 thing	 (rather	 than	
getting	‘a’	to	actually	refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing).	On	this	account	we	do	not	get	‘a’	
to	actually	refer	–	we	merely	suppose	that	it	does.	And	this	alternative	does	not	give	
B&M	an	argument	for	arbitrary	reference:	since	‘a’	does	not	refer	it	does	not	have	its	
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reference	fixed,	so	there	is	no	need	to	appeal	to	arbitrary	reference	to	explain	how	it	
has	its	reference	fixed.	Note	that	on	this	account	we	don’t	even	need	to	suppose	that	
‘a’	got	its	reference	fixed	arbitrarily	–	supposing	that	‘a’	refers	to	one	of	many	p	things	
does	not	require	us	to	suppose	that	it	had	its	reference	fixed	arbitrarily	to	one	of	those	
things.	So	this	account	does	not	commit	us	in	any	way	to	an	ability	to	arbitrarily	refer	
to	things.	So	it	does	not	help	B&M’s	case	for	arbitrary	reference.	
	
But	I	don’t	think	that	this	account	is	right.	Here	is	one	argument	(I’ll	give	another	one	
later,	a	better	one).	In	line	3,	rather	than	introduce	‘a’	we	might	instead	just	direct	our	
thoughts	to	one	of	the	p	things,	and	argue	as	follows:	“Consider	one	of	these	p	things;	
it	is	a	q	thing;	so	there	are	some	q	things.”	When	we	do	this	we	are	not	supposing	that	
we	are	considering	one	of	 these	p	things	–	we	actually	are	 considering	one	of	 them.	
But	by	introducing	‘a’	in	line	3	all	that	we	are	doing	is	giving	ourselves	a	way	of	talking	
about	 the	 considering	 that	 we	 are	 doing.	 Since	 we	 actually	 are	 considering	 one	 of	
these	supposedly	p	things,	we	are	also	actually	are	referring	to	one	of	them	with	‘a’,	
not	merely	supposing	that	we	are.	
	
So	we	start	by	supposing	that	the	premises	are	both	true;	in	particular,	that	there	are	
some	p	things.	This	makes	it	the	case	that	there	are	some	things	that	supposedly	have	
p.	 Then,	 in	 line	3,	we	get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	one	of	 these	 things	 that	 supposedly	have	p	
(fixing	the	reference	of	‘a’	arbitrarily	to	one	of	them,	if	there	are	more	than	one).	
	
Having	 fixed	 the	 reference	of	 ‘a’	 to	one	of	 the	supposedly	p	 things	we	can	 then	 talk	
about	 this	 thing,	and	say	what	 is	 true	of	 it	on	 the	 supposition	 that	 the	premises	are	
both	 true.	On	 this	 supposition	 line	3	 (“a	 is	a	p	 thing”)	 is	 true,	not	because	 it	 follows	
from	line	1	but	because	of	 the	way	that	we	have	fixed	the	reference	of	 ‘a’	 (we	have	
fixed	its	reference	to	a	thing	that	supposedly	has	p).	And,	on	this	supposition,	line	4	is	
also	true,	since	2	and	3	are	true	and	4	follows	from	2	and	3.	And	C	is	true	too,	since	it	
follows	from	4.	This	establishes	that	C	is	true	on	the	supposition	that	1	and	2	are	both	
true.	And	this	is	how	lines	3	and	4	help	us	to	see	that	the	original	argument	is	valid	–	
they	help	us	to	see	that	C	is	true	on	the	supposition	that	1	and	2	are	both	true.	
	
5.	The	problems	avoided	
	
We	are	now	in	a	position	to	see	how	the	account	that	I	am	proposing	would	work	for	
all	properties	p	and	q,	avoided	the	problems	for	the	p	thing	account	that	 I	described	
above.	
	
First,	what	if	p	is	such	that	there	are	no	p	things?	Answer:	if	we	suppose	that	there	are	
some	p	things	then	there	are	some	things	which	supposedly	have	p,	even	if	there	are	
no	actual	p	things,	and	these	are	available	for	‘a’	to	refer	to.	
	
Second,	what	 if	p	 is	such	that	there	are	no	possible	p	things?	Answer:	 if	we	suppose	
that	 there	 are	 some	 p	 things	 then	 there	 are	 some	 things	which	 supposedly	 have	 p,	
even	if	there	are	no	possible	p	things,	and	these	are	available	for	‘a’	to	refer	to.	
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Third,	 what	 if	 p	 and	 q	 are	 such	 that	 the	 premises	 are	 inconsistent?	 Answer:	 if	 we	
suppose	 that	 there	are	 some	p	 things	 then	 there	are	 some	 things	which	 supposedly	
have	 p,	 even	 if	 other	 assumptions	 are	 inconsistent	with	 this	 assumption,	 and	 these	
things	are	available	 for	 ‘a’	 to	refer	 to.	Compare	the	 fictional	case:	 there	 is	a	 fictional	
character	Sherlock	Holmes,	even	if	the	stories	about	Sherlock	Holmes	are	inconsistent.	
Note	that	under	 inconsistent	suppositions	everything	 is	 true,	so	the	account	predicts	
that	 if	 p	 and	 q	 are	 such	 that	 the	 premises	 are	 inconsistent	 then	 we	 can	 use	 the	
extended	argument	to	derive	any	conclusion	from	these	premises.	But	that	is	the	right	
result.	
	
Fourth,	what	 if	p	 is	 the	property	of	being	a	never-referred-to	thing?	Answer:	we	can	
get	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 something	 that	 supposedly	 is	never-referred-to,	because	 ‘a’	 refers	
from	outside	the	supposition,	and	the	thing	it	refers	to	is	never-referred-to	only	inside	
the	 supposition.	 ‘a’	 refers,	 from	outside	 the	 supposition,	 to	 something	which,	 inside	
the	supposition,	is	never-referred-to.	There	is	no	contradiction	in	that	(just	as	there	is	
no	contradiction	in	our	naming	and	referring	to	a	character	in	a	story	who,	in	the	story,	
has	no	name).	
	
You	might	wonder	whether	the	present	account	faces	something	like	this	last	problem	
but	with	a	different	property	–	 the	property	of	being	a	never-supposed-of	 thing.	For	
we	might	argue	as	follows:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	never-supposed-of	things	
2.	 All	never-supposed-of	things	are	q	things	
Therefore,	
C.	 There	are	some	q	things	
	
According	to	the	present	account,	we	use	‘a’	to	refer	to	a	supposedly	never-supposed-
of	 thing.	 Isn’t	 that	 impossible?	 No,	 and	 for	 the	 same	 reason.	 We	 can	 suppose,	 of	
something,	 that	 it	 is	 never-supposed-of,	 because	 the	 supposing	 occurs	 outside	 the	
supposition,	and	the	thing	of	which	we	are	supposing	is	never-supposed-of	only	inside	
the	supposition.	We	suppose,	 from	outside	the	supposition,	something	of	something	
which,	inside	the	supposition,	is	never-supposed-of.	There	is	no	contradiction	in	that.				
	
6.	One	more	argument	
	
I	 can	now	give	another	argument	against	 the	 idea	 that	 in	 line	3	we	 suppose	 that	 ‘a’	
refers	to	a	p	thing.	If	this	were	right	then	we	could	use	existential	instantiation	to	show	
that	 the	 proposition	 that	 there	 are	 some	 never-referred-to	 things	 entails	 the	
proposition	 that	 grass	 is	 green	 (or	 any	 other	 proposition).	 For	 we	 could	 argue	 as	
follows:	
	
1.	 There	are	some	never-referred-to	things	(Premise)	
2.	 a	is	a	never-referred-to	thing	(From	1,	by	existential	instantiation)	
C.	 Grass	is	green	(From	2)	
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In	line	2	we	suppose,	on	this	account,	that	‘a’	refers	to	a	never-referred-to	thing.	But	
that	is	to	suppose	something	inconsistent.	So	on	this	supposition	everything	is	true.	In	
particular,	it	is	true	that	grass	is	green.	So	if	this	account	were	true	then	we	could	use	
existential	 instantiation	 to	 show	 that	 the	 proposition	 that	 there	 are	 some	 never-
referred-to	things	entails	the	proposition	that	grass	is	green.	But	we	cannot	do	that.	So	
this	account	is	not	true.	
	
7.	Conclusion	
	
I	have	argued	that	 if,	 in	the	example	of	existential	 instantiation	that	we	started	with,	
we	 use	 ‘a’	 to	 refer	 to	 something	 then	 it	 cannot	 be	 to	 a	 p	 thing,	 either	 actual	 or	
possible.	I	have	suggested	an	alternative	referential	account	–	that	that	we	use	‘a’	to	
refer	to	a	supposedly	p	thing.	I	have	explained	how	using	‘a’	in	this	way	helps	us	to	see	
that	the	original	argument	is	valid,	no	matter	which	properties	p	and	q	are.	And	I	have	
pointed	out	that	this	alternative	account	still	gives	B&M	their	hoped-for	argument	for	
arbitrary	 reference.	 But	 the	 alternative	 account	 relies	 on	 something	 controversial	 –	
that	if	we	suppose	that	there	are	some	p	things	there	are	some	things	that	supposedly	
have	p.	So	I’m	not	sure	whether	this	is	an	account	that	we	can	ultimately	maintain.	But	
if	we	want	a	referential	account	of	the	role	of	‘a’	then	I	don’t	see	any	alternative.	
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